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Non‐Technical Summary 
Behavioral  economics  has  provided  striking  insights  that  are  contrary  to  the  standard 
economic  framework.  Years  of  experiments,  in  laboratories  as  well  as  in  the  field,  have 
shown the diversity of human actions and the failure to predict these actions with standard 
(neo‐)classical  assumptions  of  plain  utility  maximization.  Numerous  researchers  have 
contributed  impressive  results,  particularly  to  the  field  of  incentives  and motivation.  The 
evidence suggests that  individuals give more  importance to the present than to the  future 
and suffer more from losses than they enjoy gains of equal magnitude. They tend to behave 
with an aversion to inequality and can be motivated with non‐monetary rewards. 
However, so far, one important field has been left aside, namely studies with clear impact on 
the educational system and the students involved in it. This is unfortunate to the effect that 
unambiguously positive  results on  student performance  and by  association education  can 
have vast impacts not only on student life but also on the whole economy. 
To  fill  this  gap,  we  conducted  several  field  experiments  to  test  behavioral  principles  on 
approximately 6,500 elementary and high school students in Chicago. Immediately before a 
standardized,  computer‐based  test, of which  the  students need  to  take  three  a  year,  the 
students  received  information  about  one  specific  of  several  incentive  schemes.  Students 
could receive a reward if they improved their performance on the test in comparison to their 
previous  test  score. The  incentives were either monetary or non‐monetary and  rewarding 
followed either immediately after the test or with a delay of one month. Additionally, some 
incentives were  framed as  losses, meaning  that  students  received  the  reward beforehand 
and  were  informed  the  reward  would  be  taken  away,  if  they  did  not  improve  their 
performance.  
The  results  of  our  set  of  experiments  are  in  line  with  previous  research,  showing  that 
incentives matter.  In  particular, we  show  that  financial  incentives,  if  large  enough,  have 
positive  effects  on  performance,  confirming  conventional  wisdom.  Furthermore,  we 
demonstrate  effects  of  rather  unusual  incentive  schemes.  The  possibility  of  losing  a  just 
received $10‐bill or  trophy  is more powerful  than  the chance of being  rewarded after  the 
test.  
We also  find a considerably  larger effect of non‐monetary rewards  ‐ trophies  in our case  ‐ 
than of monetary payments of either $10 or $20 for younger students. This, however, is not 
true for older students. Moreover, only immediate incentives work whereas a delay of even 
one month does not increase motivation at all. 
This has important policy implications. We cannot confirm the common fear that paying kids 
reduces their motivation to perform well in the absence of rewards. Furthermore, given the 
fact that the greatest returns of education come with a delay of months (or even years),  it 
seems currently schools lack lack adequate incentive schemes to make pupils perform well. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die  Verhaltensökonomie  hat  in  den  vergangenen  Jahren  bemerkenswerte  Erkenntnisse 
hervorgebracht,  die  vielfach  in  Kontrast  zu  den  klassischen  Verhaltensannahmen  der 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften  stehen.  So  haben  Experimente  –  sowohl  im  Labor  als  auch  im 
Feld – gezeigt, dass es nicht adäquat  ist, dieses Handeln mit den üblichen (neo‐)klassischen 
Ansätzen einer  simplen Nutzenmaximierung  zu beschreiben. Beachtenswerte Erkenntnisse 
im Hinblick auf die Anreize und Motivation menschlichen Handelns sind unter anderem, dass 
Menschen  die  Gegenwart  stärker  als  die  Zukunft  gewichten  und  mehr  unter  Verlusten 
leiden,  als  sie  sich  über  Gewinne  gleicher  Größe  freuen.  Weiterhin  haben  Menschen 
offenbar  eine  deutliche Abneigung  gegenüber Ungleichheit,  verschenken Geld  an  Fremde 
und lassen sich durch nicht monetäre Anreize motivieren. 
Ein  ökonomisch wichtiges Handlungs(um)feld wurde  von  der  Verhaltensökonomie  bislang 
jedoch kaum untersucht: es gibt bislang so gut wie keine Studien über wirksame Anreize und 
Motivationsstrategien im Bildungssystem und den darin lernenden Schülern. Die vorliegende 
Studie füllt diese Lücke. 
Mit etwa 6500 Grundschülern und Schülern weiterführender Schulen aus Chicago wurden 
verschiedene  Feldexperimente  durchgeführt,  um  Verhaltensprinzipien  dieser  speziellen 
Bevölkerungsgruppe  nachzugehen.  Die  Schüler  wurden  dabei  unmittelbar  vor  einem 
standardisierten,  computerbasierten  Test,  an  dem  sie  drei  Mal  jährlich  teilnehmen,  mit 
individuell  verschiedenen  Leistungsanreizen  konfrontiert.  Die  gesetzten  Anreize,  sich 
gegenüber den bisherigen eigenen Testergebnissen  zu  verbessern, waren monetärer oder 
auch nicht monetärer Natur. Weiterhin wurden die Belohnungen entweder direkt oder mit 
einer einmonatigen Verspätung ausgegeben. Schließlich wurden einige der Anreize  in Form 
von Verlusten gestaltet. Dabei erhielten die Schüler zwar im Voraus eine Belohnung, jedoch 
verbunden mit der  Information, dass diese wieder weggenommen werde,  sofern  sich  ihre 
Leistung nicht verbessere. 
Die im Feld beobachteten Leistungsveränderungen zeigen, dass Anreize auch für Schüler von 
Bedeutung  sind.  Monetäre  Anreize  sind  leistungsfördernd,  sofern  sie  groß  genug  sind. 
Zudem  stellen wir bei  jüngeren Schülern  fest, dass Belohnungen nicht monetärer Art –  in 
unserem Fall Pokale – einen bedeutend größeren Effekt haben als Zahlungen von entweder 
10$  oder  20$.  Darüber  hinaus  sind  nur  unmittelbare  Anreize  wirksam.  Bereits  eine 
Verzögerung der Belohnung um einen Monat führt zu keiner Motivationssteigerung. 
Die Ergebnisse entkräftigen die häufig geäußerte Befürchtung, wonach monetäre Anreize die 
Motivation von Kindern senken, sobald keine Belohnung mehr  in Aussicht steht. Außerdem 
scheinen  im  heutigen  Bildungssystem  angesichts  der  Tatsache,  dass  die  größten 
Bildungserträge erst mit einer Verspätung von Monaten (oder gar Jahren) anfallen, adäquate 
Anreizsysteme, die effektiv zu besseren Leistungen anregen können, bislang zu fehlen. 
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Abstract
Decades of research on behavioral economics have established the importance of
factors that are typically absent from the standard economic framework: reference
dependent preferences, hyperbolic preferences, and the value placed on non-financial
rewards. To date, these insights have had little impact on the way the educational
system operates. Through a series of field experiments involving thousands of primary
and secondary school students, we demonstrate the power of behavioral economics to
influence educational performance. Several insights emerge. First, we find that incen-
tives framed as losses have more robust effects than comparable incentives framed as
gains. Second, we find that non-financial incentives are considerably more cost-effective
than financial incentives for younger students, but were not effective with older stu-
dents. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, consistent with hyperbolic discounting,
all motivating power of the incentives vanishes when rewards are handed out with a
delay. Since the rewards to educational investment virtually always come with a delay,
our results suggest that the current set of incentives may lead to underinvestment. For
policymakers, our findings imply that in the absence of immediate incentives, many
students put forth low effort on standardized tests, which may create biases in measures
of student ability, teacher value added, school quality, and achievement gaps.
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1 Introduction
Behavioral economics has now gone beyond mere academic curiosity, touching nearly every
field in economics. Theorists are recognizing behavioral regularities that lie outside of the
standard paradigm in their models, empiricists are taking new behavioral predictions to the
lab and field, and policymakers are increasingly recognizing the power of psychology when
crafting new legislation. One area where behavioral economics has made only limited inroads,
however, is in education circles. This is puzzling since it is an area where the insights gained
from behavioral economics might be especially great.
In this study, we use a series of field experiments to explore how behavioral economics
can be leveraged to improve student performance. Our experiments revolve around three
major behavioral tenets. First, some people have reference-dependent preferences, wherein
utility is determined not just by absolute levels of consumption, but also by consumption
relative to a reference point. For instance, in certain cases, such people will exhibit behavior
consistent with a notion of loss aversion, an insight gained from Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) prospect theory.
Second, non-material rewards, for example, in the form of awards and trophies can have
considerable motivational power (Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011). Such rewards derive their
motivatational power from a variety of mechanisms including status, self-image concerns,
and relative performance feedback that have been shown to affect behavior.1
Finally, some people have hyperbolic preferences, overweighting the present so much that
future rewards are largely ignored (see, e.g., Strotz 1955, Laibson 1997). Such preferences
can lead to underinvestment when (as in education) the returns to achievement are largely
delayed.2
1See Ball et al. (2001) and Huberman et al. (2004) on status; Blanes i Vidal et al. (2009), Tran and
Zeckhauser (2009) and Barankay (2011) on relative performance feedback; and Ariely et al. (2009) and Della
Vigna et al. (2012) on image motivation and social pressure.
2Previous studies find a negative correlation between hyperbolic discount rates and educational outcomes
(Kirby et al. 2002, Kirby et al. 2005). Similarly, Mischel et al. (1989) find that measures of ability to delay
gratification in early childhood are predictive of longer-term academic achievement.
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We investigate each of these three areas of behavioral economics using field experiments
conducted over multiple sites and years. This permits a glimpse of behavior not only within
the experimental period but for months afterwards. Our field experiments include approx-
imately 6,500 elementary and high school students in three school districts in and around
Chicago. The typical study reports findings from a single experiment without any replica-
tions to examine transferability to different settings and different scales. This paper addresses
both questions by studying the impact of various incentive designs in several settings, among
a wide age range of students and in school districts of very different size.3
In our baseline setup, students are offered cash or non-pecuniary rewards for an improve-
ment in test scores. The tests last between 15 - 60 minutes, yielding a high hourly wage
(particularly in the highest financial incentive group) that is likely quite salient among our
subject pool of low-income children and adolescents. We investigate the effectiveness of low
and high financial incentives ($10, $20) and compare these to the impact of non-monetary
rewards in the form of a trophy for achievement. These incentives are presented in either
the gain or the loss domain. In addition, we test directly the importance of discount rates
by offering incentives either immediately after the test or with a delay (a month after the
test).
Importantly, the incentives are announced immediately before the test (with no advance
notice). This design allows us to isolate the effect of incentives on performance solely through
inducement of greater short-run effort – avoiding confounding due to discount rates or human
capital accumulation (i.e., studying for the test).
We find that incentives affect student performance, although there is substantial variation
in the effectiveness of rewards across settings. Yet, one robust result is that incentives framed
as losses have consistently large effects relative to other educational interventions (0.08−0.20
standard deviations). These effect sizes are comparable to those achieved through a one-
3In a similar vein, Braun et al. (2011) test a single performance pay incentive among 2,600 students in
59 schools and seven states. Fryer (2011) reports on a series of financial incentive programs carried out in a
number of large American school districts (but does not compare different incentive designs within a single
setting).
3
standard deviation increase in teacher quality (Rockoff 2004, Hanushek and Rivken 2005,
Kane and Staiger 2008) or 20% reductions in class size (Krueger 1999). We find mixed
evidence on the impact of incentives framed as gains with large effects in two school districts
(0.16−0.46 standard deviations) and no effects in the third. We also find that that while older
students are more responsive to financial incentives, non-financial incentives are as effective
as financial incentives among younger students (and thus more cost-effective). Finally, we
find that non-immediate incentives (rewarded a month after the test) have no effect.
The design also allows us to uncover some of the underlying heterogeneities that drive
the overall effectiveness of reward schemes: younger children are more responsive than older
children, for whom only the high financial incentive presented as a loss affected performance.
Moreover, boys are more responsive to short-term incentives than girls. Overall, effects are
more pronounced for math tests than for reading tests.
Our results suggest that in the absence of immediate incentives, many students put
forth low effort on the standardized tests that we study. These findings have important
implications for policymakers because standardized assessment tests are often high-stakes
for teachers and principals (e.g., as determinants of school resources), but low-stakes for the
individual students choosing to exert effort on the test. Low baseline effort among certain
groups of students can create important biases in measures of student ability, teacher value
added, school quality, and achievement gaps.4 If delays in rewards reduce student effort
in this context, it would seem likely that the general pattern of delayed rewards in the
educational setting (e.g., increased earnings associated with school attainment accrue only
with lags of years or even decades) could induce sub-optimal effort. Contrary to a widespread
concern, we also do not find that incentives have a detrimental effect on performance in
4Baumert and Demmrich (2001) and Braun et al. (2011) make a similar argument based on their findings
and review the literature on achievement gaps due to differential motivation. In a similar vein, Jacob (2005)
uncovers evidence that differential effort on the part of students can explain the otherwise puzzling divergence
over time in the performance of students in the Chicago Public Schools on high-stakes versus low-stakes tests.
It appears that CPS teachers and administrators became increasingly successful over a period of years at
convincing students to take the high-stakes test seriously, but that same effort did not spill over to the low
stakes state-administered tests.
4
subsequent tests.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the underlying
theoretical framework that motivates our design. Section III describes the experimental
design and implementation. Section IV discusses the main results and potential sources
of heterogeneity. Section V concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of the
findings.
2 Theoretical Framework
Although financial incentives are ubiquitous in modern society, direct financial incentives
have not traditionally been used to motivate student effort and performance. In recent years,
however, monetary rewards have begun to attract attention from educators and policymak-
ers. Recent programs have conditioned monetary rewards on a variety of measures including
school enrollment, attendance, behavior, grades, test performance, and matriculation.5
Although results have varied across settings, financial incentives have generally been
associated with modest positive improvements in student performance. Typically, these
incentive programs have remained in place for an extended period of time (e.g. a school year)
with the goal of affecting student behavior over the duration of that time horizon. Numerous
studies however find that children and adolescents tend to exhibit high discount rates and
have difficulty planning for the future (see, e.g., Bettinger and Slonim 2007, Steinberg et
al. 2009 for further discussion). They may therefore respond more strongly to rewards with
very short time horizons compared to incentives extending over several months or years.
At the same time, behavioral anomalies, such as the endowment effect (Thaler 1980),
status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), and observed divergences of willingness to
pay and willingness to accept measures of value (Hanemann 1991) have arisen in the broader
5Examples include Progresa in Mexico which offered incentives for school enrollment and attendance
(Schultz 2004, Behrman et al. 2005). A similar conditional cash transfer program was instituted in Colombia
(Barrera-Osorio et al. 2008). Other programs have based rewards on overall school performance (see Angrist
et al. 2006, Fryer 2011, Levitt et al. 2010, Leuven et al. 2010).
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literature. These examples of reference-dependent decision making are broadly consistent
with a notion of loss aversion, an insight gained from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
prospect theory. A more recent branch of behavioral economics has explored the effectiveness
of non-financial rewards (see, e.g., Frey 2007, Bradler et al. 2012, Ashraf et al. 2011).
To formalize these ideas, we consider a representative agent who derives benefits and
costs as follows in period t :
vt = v(et, rt, r
r
t ) = pi(et)[u(rt) +R(rt, r
r
t )] + [1− pi(et)]R(0, rrt )− c(et)
where individuals receive rewards r with probability pi (and receive 0 with probability 1−pi),
u is utility over rewards, R is the value function of prospect theory and c is the cost of effort
e. Let pi(.) be increasing and concave in e, u(.) be increasing and concave in r, c(.) be
increasing and convex in e, and we normalize u(0) = 0. We define utility derived in relation
to a reference point rr, R(.):
R(r, rr) =
 g(r − r
r), if r ≥ rr
h(r − rr), if r < rr
where g is increasing and concave, h is increasing and convex and we normalize g(0) = 0.
Rewards r are a weighted sum of the material benefits w and non-pecuniary benefits b that
the agent receives
r = µw + ηb
where µ and η represent the weights of material and non-pecuniary benefits for the indi-
vidual’s utility, respectively. As aforementioned, examples of non-pecuniary benefits include
status, a positive self-image, enjoyment of the task, and the trophy value of certain rewards.6
A person in period t cares not only about her present instantaneous utility vt but also
6For individuals that care about status and a positive self-image, non-pecuniary gifts carry additional
utility when they remind oneself and others of a special achievement of the individual (see, e.g., Loewenstein
and Issacharoff (1994) on the trophy value of rewards and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) on self-signaling).
6
about her future instantaneous utilities.7 V t(vt, vt−1, . . . vT ) represents a person’s intertem-
poral preferences from the perspective of period t, where V t is continuous and increasing in
all its components and has the following form
V t(vt, vt+1, . . . vT ) ≡ δtvt + β
∑T
r=t+1
δtvt for all t, where 0 < β, δ ≤ 1.
Individuals exhibit hyperbolic discounting and are present-biased if β < 1 (δ represents the
constant discount rate). If students have such preferences, then their utility from immediate
rewards is far greater than the utility they receive from the same reward in the future.
In period t = 0, a student chooses effort to maximize V 0. If rewards are immediate, then
the student’s objective function is
max
e0
pi(e0)[u(r0) +R(r0, r
r
0)] + [1− pi(e0)]R(0, rr0)− c(e0)
If rewards are delayed by one period, then the student’s objective function becomes
max
e0
βδ {pi(e0)[u(r1) +R(r1, rr1)] + [1− pi(e0)]R(0, rr1)} − c(e0)
where r0 = r1 ≡ r and rr0 = rr1 ≡ rr. The respective first order conditions for these equations
are c′ = pi′(ur +Rr −R0) and c′ = βδ[pi′(ur +Rr −R0)].8 The cost of effort is equivalent in
both cases because effort is always exerted immediately. However, the benefit of the delayed
reward is discounted by βδ ≤ 1, thus reducing optimal effort under delayed rewards relative
to optimal effort under immediate rewards.
We can similarly compare the objective function for immediate rewards presented as
gains9
max
e
pi(e)[u(r) +R(r, 0)] + [1− pi(e)]R(0, 0)− c(e)
7We follow the framework developed in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
8ux ≡ u(x) and Rx ≡ (x, rr)
9Hereafter t=0 unless otherwise noted.
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to the objective function for immediate rewards presented as losses
max
e
pi(e)[u(r) +R(r, rr)] + [1− pi(e)]R(0, rr)− c(e)
where r = rr. The respective first order conditions for these equations are c′ = pi′(ur + g(r))
and c′ = pi′(ur − h(−r)). If losses are felt more strongly than gains −h(−r) > g(r), then
optimal effort will increase if rewards are framed as losses rather than gains. Estimates of the
ratio of h and g (when linearity is assumed) have found −h(−x)/g(x) ∼= 2 (see Tversky and
Kahneman 1991). In the spirit of this finding, if students are loss-averse, then the negative
utility a student receives from a loss of x is greater in magnitude than the positive utility
she receives from a gain of x for any positive x. And thus optimal effort will increase when
rewards are framed as losses rather than gains.
Finally, we compare the objective function for immediate monetary rewards rm
max
e
pi(e)[u(rm) +R(rm, rr)] + [1− pi(e)]R(0, rr)− c(e)
to the objective function for immediate non-pecuniary rewards rn
max
e
pi(e)[u(rn) +R(rn, rr)] + [1− pi(e)]R(0, rr)− c(e)
where rn and rm are of equivalent cash value. The respective first order conditions for
these equations are c′ = pi′[u(rm) + R(rm, rr) − R0] and c′ = pi′[u(rn) + R(rn, rr) − R0].
Optimal effort will be higher under non-pecuniary rewards than under monetary rewards
when rn = µwn + ηb exceeds rm = µw, where w is the cash value of the rewards and wn ≤ w
is the material benefit of the non-pecuniary prize.10 This occurs when µ(w − wn) < ηb .
Accordingly, depending on the relative weight that students place on non-pecuniary ben-
10We assume that cash prizes provide zero non-pecuniary benefits bm = 0. The material benefit of non-
pecuniary rewards is never greater than and typically less than their cash value wn ≤ w because they are
less fungible than cash (Waldfogel 1993).
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efits (η  0 represents a strong preference for non-pecuniary rewards), the utility derived
from gifts or trophies potentially exceeds the value of monetary rewards of equivalent cost.
The utility weights µ and η may also vary across individuals. For example the utility weight-
ing of non-pecuniary benefits η may decline with age, in which case non-pecuniary rewards
are relatively more effective among younger students.
In all treatments, we announce the rewards immediately before the incentivized test (with
no advance notice). This ensures that as in the equations above, students are choosing one-
time effort in the immediate period only – i.e., there is no delay between effort exertion and
immediate rewards. This feature allows us to ignore time discounting of effort as well as
human capital gains that may accrue from effort in previous periods (e.g., studying for the
test), and allows us to focus on a decision that is most in concert with the theory tested.
Most previous programs that have rewarded incentives based on test performance have
announced the incentive well in advance of the test using high school exit and achievement
exams in Israel (Angrist and Lavy 2009) and Texas (Jackson 2007); and standardized tests for
elementary/middle school students in Kenya (Kremer et al. 2009), India (Berry 2009), Ohio
(Bettinger 2010) and New York City (Fryer 2011). Studies that have announced incentives
immediately before the test have typically distributed rewards with a delay. The evidence
on such delayed rewards is mixed. O’Neil et al. (1997, 2004) find that delayed financial
incentives can increase eighth grade test scores but have no effect on twelfth grade test
scores, even at very high levels (up to $100 on a 10 question test).11 In a similar design,
Baumert and Demmrich (2001) find no effects of financial incentives on ninth grade test
scores. These studies also find no treatment effects from non-financial incentives including
feedback, ranking, goal setting, achievement certificates, and test scores counting towards
classroom grades.12
11O’Neil (2004) also offered an immediate incentive of up to $20 based on answering 2 practice questions
correctly. However, all participants in both the incentive and control groups answered the questions correctly,
precluding any measurement of a treatment effect.
12To our best knowledge, a study produced concurrently to ours - Braun et al. (2011) - is the only other
study to announce the incentive immediately before the test and distribute the reward immediately after the
test. They offer a performance-based incentive of up to $30 to eighth and twelfth graders on a low stakes
9
3 Experimental Design and Implementation
The field experiment was carried out in six waves in three low-performing school districts
in and around Chicago: Bloom Township (Bloom), Chicago Heights (CH) and Chicago
Public Schools (CPS). The first two waves were conducted in winter and spring 2009 among
high school sophomores at one high school in Bloom. The third wave took place in spring
2010 with a new cohort of Bloom sophomores. The fourth wave also took place in spring
2010 among 3rd-8th graders in seven elementary schools in Chicago Heights. The final
waves scaled up the Bloom and Chicago Heights experiments and were conducted in 26 CPS
elementary schools among 2nd-8th graders in fall 2010 and winter 2011.
The field experiment took place during regularly scheduled sessions of standardized di-
agnostic tests. These are low-stakes tests that students do not generally prepare for or have
any external reason to do well on. Students generally take the tests three times a year in the
fall, winter, and spring.13 They are computer-based and last between 15-60 minutes with
students’ results available immediately after the test ends.14
In each session, immediately before testing began, the test administrator announced the
incentive and told students that they would receive the reward immediately (or a month)
after the test ended if they improved upon their baseline score from a prior testing session.
Immediately after the test ended, we handed out rewards to qualifying students, except in
the case of delayed rewards which were distributed a month after testing.15 Students received
no advance notice of the incentives prior to the testing sessions.16
standardized test and find positive and significant treatment effects compared to a control group which
received no incentive and a “fixed incentive” group which received $20 regardless of performance.
13In Chicago Heights, students also take a pre-test at the beginning of the year.
14In Bloom, the experiment took place during the STAR Reading Assessment, which is adaptive and lasts
about 15 minutes. In Chicago Heights, the experiment took place during the math portion of the ThinkLink
Predictive Assessment Series, which lasts about 30 minutes. In CPS, the experiment took place during either
the math or reading portion of the Scantron Performance Series, which each last about 60 minutes.
15In CPS, about one-fifth of classes did not complete testing in a single session due to time constraints. In
these cases, we returned to the school after every student had completed the test. Excluding these classes
from the analysis does not affect the results.
16One week before testing, we sent home a consent form to parents stating that we would like their child
to participate in a study to be conducted during the upcoming test. And, that their child could receive
financial or non-financial (where applicable) compensation for their participation. We did not specify the
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Incentivized students were offered one of the following rewards: financial low ($10 cash),
financial high ($20 cash) or non-financial (trophy). In the loss condition (financial high and
non-financial) students received the reward at the start of the testing session and were
informed that they would keep the reward if they improved (and that they would lose
the reward if they did not improve). Students also filled in a sheet confirming receipt
of the reward (and in CPS what they planned do with it) and kept the reward at their
computer during testing. In the control groups, the test administrator either did not make
any announcement (control-no statement) or encouraged students to improve on the test
but did not offer any incentive to do so (control statement).17 This allows us to test
whether there are effects due to the presence of the experimenters (we did not attend “no
statement” treatments) or of merely requesting the student to improve. Scripts for the
different treatments can be found in Appendix A. An overview of the treatments conducted
is presented in Table 1.18
We randomized at the level of English class (Bloom) or school-grade (CH and CPS) and
blocked the randomization on average baseline score, school (CH and CPS), grade (CH and
CPS), and race/ethnicity (CH).19 In cases where students participated in two waves (Bloom
2009 and CPS 2010/2011), we re-randomized for the second wave.20 Thus, some students
incentives and we sent the same consent form to the treatment and control groups. In Bloom and Chicago
Heights, parents only needed to sign the consent form if they did not want their child to participate in the
study. Less than 1% of parents opted out by returning the form. In CPS, parents needed to sign the consent
form in order for their child to participate. 57% of parents returned the signed consent form prior to the
fall session and 71% of forms were returned prior to the winter session. In order to participate, students in
all sessions that we attended also signed a student assent form immediately before they took the test. All
students opted into the study by signing the assent form. The analysis only includes students who met the
consent criteria prior to treatment.
17In Chicago Heights, a second financial low (comparison) treatment and a second control-statement
(comparison) treatment added a statement that we would compare a student’s improvement to three other
students with similar past scores. The non-financial treatment added a statement that we would take a photo
of qualifying students and post it in their school. In CPS, control-statement students were additionally told
(as incentivized students were) that they would learn their scores either immediately or with a one month
delay (control-statement-delayed) after testing.
18The various waves included additional incentive treatments which are available in an online appendix.
The main part of this paper only includes the incentives that are common across the settings.
19In Bloom, we blocked on baseline reading score. If the baseline score was not available, we blocked classes
by their track: regular, remedial or honors. In CH and CPS, we blocked on baseline math and reading scores.
20In the second CPS wave, we additionally blocked on treatment received in the first wave, math and
reading scores in the first wave, and treatment received in a separate intervention that took place between
11
received the same treatment in both sessions, while others received a different treatment in
the two sessions. In the two cases where students received incentives in a previous session
(Bloom spring 2009 and CPS winter 2011) there was no particular reason for students to
expect the experiments to continue, or if the experiments did continue, that they would
receive a particular incentive. It is possible, however, that students anticipated there would
be incentives in their second testing session. The results presented below are robust to
restricting the sample to first-time incentives (i.e., to students in their first testing session
and those in their second session who were in the control group in the first session).
Tables 2a-2c report summary statistics by treatment group for pre-treatment character-
istics in Bloom (2009 and 2010), Chicago Heights (2010) and CPS (2010 and 2011). The
pre-treatment characteristics include baseline score, grade (CH and CPS), test subject (CPS)
and the following demographics: gender, race/ethnicity, free/reduced lunch status and (in
CH and CPS) eligibility for an Individualized Education Plan (IEP).21 While the groups are
generally balanced, the tables indicate the presence of some significant differences between
incentive and pooled control (statement and no statement) groups, with standard errors
clustered by class (Bloom) or school-grade (CH and CPS). In Bloom (Table 2a) the only
significant differences are the proportion of black and Hispanic students in the financial low
($10) treatment. In Chicago Heights (Table 2b) all three treatment groups have a signif-
icantly lower average grade than control. The financial high and non-financial treatment
groups have significantly lower proportions of black students and significantly higher pro-
portions of Hispanic students than control. In CPS (Table 2c) the various treatment groups
are balanced on average grade and baseline score (the non-financial incentive group has
higher baseline scores than control significant at the p < 0.1 level). There are statistically
significant differences (both positive and negative) in the proportion of math tests, as well as
the two waves.
21Baseline test score is a standardized pre-treatment test score. In Bloom 2009, fall 2008 serves as the
baseline. In Bloom 2010, fall 2009 serves as the baseline. In Chicago Heights, winter 2010 serves as the
baseline. In CPS, spring 2010 serves as the baseline. Eligibility for free/reduced lunch is a proxy for family
income. Individualized Education Plans (IEPs) provide additional services to struggling students. IEP status
was not available for Bloom students.
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demographic measures in some groups. As shown below, the results are robust to including
controls for baseline performance and other pre-treatment characteristics.
4 Results
The following results estimate treatment effects on test score improvement in each of our
settings: Bloom (2009 and 2010), Chicago Heights (2010) and CPS (2010 and 2011).22 The
dependent variable in all regressions is test score improvement (in standard deviation units)
with standard errors clustered by class (Bloom) or school-grade (CH and CPS).23 For each
setting, we first present treatment effect estimates absent any controls except for the session
of the experiment (Bloom and CPS). The second column for each setting adds controls for
baseline score in the tested subject (score, score squared and score cubed), past treatment
(whether the student was incentivized in a previous wave in Bloom and CPS), test subject
(CPS), school and grade (CH and CPS), teacher fixed effects (Bloom), and demographics
(gender, race/ethnicity, free/reduced lunch eligibility and (in CH and CPS) IEP status).24
The omitted category in every regression is the pooled control (statement and no state-
ment) group for the relevant setting. There are no significant differences in performance
between the control subgroups and pooling does not affect the results. This suggests that
the treatment effects are due to the incentives rather than the presence of the experimenters
or the mere encouragement to improve.
22An analysis of the individual waves (i.e., without pooling) yields similar results.
23Improvement is measured as the difference between the standardized outcome score and the standardized
score students were told to improve on (baseline score in Bloom and CH, and prior session score in CPS).
Scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to 1. In Bloom, we standardize
scores within each testing period using the full sample of Bloom students in baseline sessions and the control
group in experimental sessions. In Chicago Heights, we standardize scores within each grade and testing
period using the full sample of Illinois students. In CPS, we standardize scores within each grade, subject
and testing period using the full population of CPS students.
24The results below are robust to bootstrapping clustered standard errors in regressions with fewer than
forty-two clusters.
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Result 1: Monetary incentives matter
We first examine whether financial incentives can improve performance by inducing
greater student effort. Table 3 reports the estimated effects of immediate incentives on
test score improvement by setting: Bloom (columns 1 and 2), Chicago Heights (columns 3
and 4) and CPS (columns 5 and 6). We find that sufficiently high financial incentives have
a substantial effect. The point estimates of the $20 incentives (framed either as gains or
losses) are consistently positive and generally statistically significant at conventional levels,
ranging from 0.057 − 0.11 standard deviations in CPS to 0.38 − 0.46 standard deviations
in Chicago Heights. The magnitude of the impact is economically significant as well: the
middle range of effects in Bloom (0.16 − 0.2 standard deviations) are equivalent to about
5-6 months’ worth of learning on the test.25 The large effects of these relatively modest
financial incentives suggest that at baseline this population of students puts forth low effort
in response to low (perceived) returns to achievement on standardized tests.
We also find that the size of the financial incentive matters. Within each setting, the
point estimates for the $10 incentives are lower than the point estimates for the $20 incen-
tives, with these differences being significant at the p < .05 level in Bloom and CPS. Overall,
the low financial incentives yields mixed results with large and significant effects in Chicago
Heights (0.2− 0.24 standard deviations) and no effect in Bloom and CPS where point esti-
mates are negative. As far as we know, ours is the first study to demonstrate that student
responsiveness to incentives is sensitive to the size of the reward. These findings suggest
that for some students effort costs may be relatively high – in Bloom for example, students
were willing to exert additional effort in response to an hourly wage of approximately $80
but not in response to a $40 per hour wage.26
25The month equivalent measure is based on the STAR Reading Assessment Instructional Reading Level.
The Instructional Reading Level is the grade level at which a student is at least 80% proficient. An IRL
score of 6.6 (the average fall baseline score) indicates that a student is reading at the equivalent of 6th grade
and 6 months (with 9 months in a school year).
26As we discuss below, it may also be the case that relatively low financial incentives crowd out intrinsic
motivation yielding smaller net effects.
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Result 2: Incentives are more powerful when framed as losses
We next examine whether insights from behavioral economics can improve the effective-
ness of incentives. The first result that stands out is that the effects of incentives framed
as losses are more robust than the effects of equivalent incentives framed as gains. The loss
treatments (either financial or non-financial) have consistently significant effects: 0.16−0.20
standard deviations in Bloom and 0.08 − 0.11 standard deviations in CPS. We find mixed
evidence on the impact of incentives framed as gains, with large effects in Bloom (0.18−0.20
standard deviations) and Chicago Heights (0.26 − 0.46 standard deviations), but no effects
in CPS. These results suggest that incentives are more powerful when framed as losses, par-
ticularly in settings where traditional rewards have little or no impact.27 While numerous
laboratory studies have demonstrated such effects, ours is among the first to provide evidence
for loss aversion in the field.28
Result 3: Non-financial incentives impact performance, but are more potent amongst younger
students
Turning to our second behavioral intervention, we compare the effects of non-pecuniary
rewards to both low and high monetary rewards, which allows us to price out the effects of
non-financial incentives. Within each setting, the point estimates for non-pecuniary rewards
(framed as gains or as losses) fall between those for the $10 and $20 treatments, and in CPS
are significantly different from the low financial incentive.29 Framed as gains, non-financial
rewards have large effects in Chicago Heights (0.25− 0.32 standard deviations) and no effect
in CPS. However, framed as losses non-financial incentives have significant effects (0.08−0.11
27In addition to framing and loss aversion, the loss treatments may also make the reward more salient and
increase students’ trust and subjective beliefs with respect to the actual payout of these unusual incentives.
28As far as we know, Hossain and List (2009) is the only previous study to test loss aversion in the field,
finding that framing bonuses as losses improves the productivity of teams in a Chinese factory. In studies run
concurrently to ours, Fryer et al. (2012) find that framing bonuses as losses improves teacher performance
while List and Savikhin (2012) find no framing effects for student incentives to make healthy food choices;
Krawacyzyk (2011) tests the effect of framing on risk taking on a final exam and finds no effect. – the study
does not examine the effect of framing on effort or overall performance.
29The effect of non-financial incentives framed as gains (losses) are significantly different from the $10
treatment at the p > 0.1 (p < 0.05) level.
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standard deviations) that are similar in size to those of the financial loss treatment and are
significantly different from the $10 incentive at the p < 0.01 level. Typically, the material
cost of non-financial incentives is low – in our case, one trophy cost approximately $3. Hence,
non-financial incentives are a potentially much more cost effective way of improving student
performance than is paying cash, particularly in combination with the loss frame.
We introduced non-financial incentives in the elementary context under the expectation
that younger children may be relatively more responsive to non-financial rewards than older
students, as they are less familiar with cash and might be more sensitive to framing effects
of non-pecuniary rewards. Table 4 estimates treatment effects in CPS for younger students
(grades 2-5) and older students (grades 6-8).30 Overall, younger students are more responsive
to incentives with large positive and significant effects in all treatments when controls are
included (except financial low). Non-financial rewards framed as a loss work best, increasing
performance by 0.18 − 0.22 standard deviations with these effects significantly larger than
financial incentives framed as a loss (p < 0.1). Again, the magnitude of these effects is
substantial. Older students, in comparison, only respond to financial incentives framed as a
loss. These rewards increase student performance by 0.13 − 0.14 standard deviations with
the effect significantly different from all other treatments (except non-financial).31 Hence,
non-financial incentives may be a cost-effective alternative to monetary rewards but only
with younger children. Non-pecuniary incentives are also attractive because schools tend to
be more comfortable rewarding students with trophies, certificates and prizes than they are
with using cash incentives.
Result 4: Rewards provided with a delay have little impact on student performance
The effects of the immediate rewards – approximately 0.1−0.2 standard deviations – are
larger than those typically found in previous studies of student incentives. As we discussed
30The sample size in Chicago Heights does not allow us to separately estimate treatment effects by age
group.
31The effect of financial incentives framed as losses are significantly different from the $10 and $20 incentives
framed as gains at the p < 0.01 level, and from non-financial rewards framed as losses at the p < 0.05 level.
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above, this divergence may be the result of students highly discounting rewards that are
received with even a short delay from the time they must exert effort. In order to explore
the importance of discount rates, we implemented a delayed version of the four effective
treatments (financial high, non-financial, financial loss and non-financial loss). In delayed
treatments, students were informed that they would receive the reward one month after the
test (rather than immediately after the test). Table 5 contrasts our findings for immediate
rewards with those from rewards that are handed out with a delay. Columns 1 and 2 replicate
the estimates for immediate treatment effects from Table 3 (excluding the $10 incentive).
Columns 3 and 4 estimate the effects of delayed rewards.
None of the estimated effects of the delayed rewards are statistically significant and more
often than not are negative in sign. In this context, students behave as if they have very high
discount rates. While this is in line with previous research highlighting the high discount
rates of children, it poses a challenge for educators and policymakers. Typically, test results
of the state-wide assessment tests are only available 1-2 months after the administration of
the tests. More broadly, if similar discount rates carry over to other parts of the education
production function our results suggest that the current set of incentives may be leading to
underinvestment in human capital.
Result 5: Treatment effects vary by age, test subject and gender
As noted above, younger students are more responsive to incentives than older students.
Tables 6 and 7 explore heterogeneity in response to incentives along two further dimensions:
test subject and gender.32
Table 6 presents treatment effects separately for reading and math in CPS. In line with
previous evidence, we find that incentives have larger effects on math than reading.33 The
32We also examine heterogeneous effects by ability (above or below median performance on baseline test)
as well as race, and find no systematic differences. Results are available upon request.
33Bettinger (2010) for example finds that incentives increase math scores by 0.15 standard deviations, but
have no effect on reading, social science and science tests. Similarly, Fryer et al. (2012) find larger effects on
math than on reading in a teacher incentive study.
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estimated effects in math are all positive and statistically significant (except financial low).34
The point estimates in math (0.08− 0.29 standard deviations) are much larger than in the
pooled regression and approach those that we found for Chicago Heights elementary schools
where only math was incentivized. In reading, on the other hand, only non-financial loss has
a positive impact on student performance while financial low even decreases performance.
Table 7 examines treatment effects by gender in Bloom and CPS.35 In both settings,
treatment effects are larger for boys than for girls. The estimated effects for boys are all
positive and significant (except financial low) with no consistently significant effects among
girls. This is in line with the literature showing that boys are more responsive to short-term
incentives than girls, which may be due in part to gender differences in time preferences.36
These results suggest that girls may be more intrinsically motivated than boys and thus
more sensitive to crowding out, which we discuss in more detail below.37
Result 6: The introduction of rewards does not crowd-out future effort
The use of financial incentives in the education context has been sharply criticized. Theo-
retically, the most compelling of these criticisms is that extrinsic rewards crowd out intrinsic
motivation, rendering such approaches ineffective in the short run, and potentially detrimen-
tal in the long run if intrinsic motivation remains low after the monetary incentives have
been removed.38 However, on tasks where intrinsic motivation is already low or zero, external
rewards are less likely to have such negative long-term effects.39 It is also worth noting that
34There are no statistically significant differences between the effect sizes of the different treatments.
35Again, the sample size in Chicago Heights is too small to conduct a similar analysis.
36Evidence on the effect of incentives by gender is mixed with longer term studies tending to find larger
effects on girls (e.g. Angrist et al. 2009, Angrist and Lavy 2007) and shorter term studies finding larger
effects among boys, particularly in the context of competition (Gneezy and Rustichini 2003, 2004). Bettinger
and Slonim (2007) and Castillo et al. (2011) find that boys are more impatient than girls.
37There is mixed evidence on gender differences in intrinsic motivation. Baumert and Demmrich (2001)
as well as Vallerand et al. (1992) report that girls are more instrinsically motivated than boys. However,
Vallerand et al. (1994) do not find a gender difference. Skaalvik and Skaalvik (2004) as well as Wolters
and Pintrich (1998) report that gender differences depend on the domain (e.g., boys are shown to be more
intrinsically motivated in math and girls in languages).
38While this argument applies to extrinsic rewards in any form, monetary incentives are considered par-
ticularly insidious to intrinsic motivation.
39For further discussion see reviews by e.g., Eisenberger and Cameron 1996, Camerer and Hogarth 1999,
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several studies have tracked student performance after incentives are removed and generally
find that students who received incentives continue to outperform the control group (see,
e.g., Bettinger and Slonim 2007, Kremer et al. 2009, Barrera-Osorio et al. 2008, Levitt et
al. 2010).40
Similarly, we explore whether the incentives have a detrimental impact on subsequent
test performance. The richness of our design also permits us to learn whether spillovers differ
between financial and non-financial incentives. Table 8 estimates the effects of incentives on
performance in the same subject in the next testing period (Bloom and CPS) and in the
subsequent subject taken in the same testing period (CPS).41 Overall, we do not find strong
evidence for crowding out – the point estimates are small in magnitude and generally not
significant at conventional levels. We also do not find differences between financial high and
non-financial incentives.
Yet, there is some evidence for crowding out within the low financial incentives treatment.
The point estimates are all negative when controls are included, with large and significant
effects in Bloom. These results are consistent with the estimated effects of the $10 treatment
on the incentivized test itself where the point estimates in Bloom and CPS are also negative
(Table 3) as well as several subgroups – older students (Table 4), girls (Table 7) and reading
tests (Table 6) with the latter effects large and significant.
Hence, we do not find evidence for the wide-spread concern that paying kids to perform
well on a test once has negative spillovers on future test performance. But in line with
previous work, we do find some evidence that low level rewards can crowd out intrinsic
Deci et al. 1999, Kohn 1999, Cameron and Pierce 2002. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) present a formal
model and evidence from a field study of motivation crowding-out in an economic context.
40Additionally, Bettinger and Slonim (2007) find no evidence that a test performance incentive program
erodes elementary school students’ intrinsic motivation measured using student and teacher surveys.
41In Bloom (columns 1-2), we regress a student’s winter 2009 treatment on her spring 2009 improvement
(controlling for spring 2009 treatment). In CPS (columns 3-4), we regress a student’s fall 2010 treatment on
her winter 2011 improvement (controlling for winter 2011 treatment) and a student’s winter 2011 treatment
on her spring 2011 improvement (no treatments occurred in spring 2011). In CPS (columns 5-6), we regress
math (reading) treatment on reading (math) improvement in the same period (fall 2010 or winter 2011) if a
student received treatment on her first subject test. The covariates include additional controls for score on
the treated test and (in column 6) baseline score in the subsequent subject.
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motivation (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a, 2000b).
5 Conclusion
This study uses a series of field experiments to explore various incentive schemes inspired by
recent findings within behavioral economics. We explore the short-term effects of financial
incentives as well as of non-financial rewards on student effort and performance, varying the
sizes of the rewards as well as their framing. We also offer rewards both immediately and
with a delay. We find considerable promise for adding behavioral tools to the educational
policymakers’ toolkit. For example, we find evidence that incentives matter, and that their
impact can be significantly enhanced if framed as a loss. Likewise, there is much to gain by
broadening the scope of incentives to include both financial and non-financial variants.
Finally, the effect of timing of payoffs provides insights into the crux of the education
problem that we face with our urban youth: effort is far removed from payout of rewards,
making it difficult for students to connect them in a useful way. The failure to recognize this
connection potentially leads to dramatic under-investment.
Continuing to apply important elements of behavioral economics to issues within educa-
tion can directly aid practitioners in need of fresh solutions to the urban school problem. Such
behavioral insights can also be used as a stepping stone for empiricists and experimentalists
alike, who with the rich array of naturally-occurring data and experimental opportunities
have a unique opportunity to examine theories heretofore untestable. Clearly, however, the-
ory and empirical work must work symbiotically – there have been fewer theoretical advances
that combine the best aspects of behavioral insights with issues germane to education. In
this spirit, we hope that our study stimulates not only new work combining psychology and
economics that deepens our understanding of empirical issues related to education, but also
deepens our understanding of the important theoretical questions facing the field.
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Table 1: Overview of the Treatments
Bloom Bloom CH CPS CPS
High School High School Elementary Elementary Elementary
2009 2010 2010 2010 2011
Control - No statement X X
Control - Statement X Xa Xb X
Financial Low ($10) X Xa X
Financial High ($20) X X X X X
Non-financial (Trophy) X X X
Financial Loss X X X
Non-financial Loss (Trophy) X X
Financial Delayed X
Non-financial Delayed X
Financial Loss Delayed X
Non-financial Loss Delayed X
Test subject - Reading X X X X
Test subject - Math X X X
Note: Financial Loss, Financial Delayed and Financial Loss Delayed all received Financial High ($20) incentives. Non-
financial Loss, Non-financial Delayed and Non-financial Loss Delayed all received Non-financial (trophy) incentives.
a Control and Financial Low ($10) are each pooled with “Comparison” treatments that add a statement that a
students improvement will be compared to three other students with similar past scores (see Appendix A for scripts).
The comparison statement did not significantly affect test performance at the 10% level.
b Control - Statement is pooled with Control - Statement - Delayed which states that students will learn their
scores “one month after the test” instead of “immediately after the test” (see Appendix A for scripts). The delayed
statement did not significantly affect test performance at the 10% level.
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Table 2a: Baseline Characteristics by Treatment Group: Bloom High School
Control Financial Low Financial High Financial Loss
N 285 166 324 154
Baseline Score 0.112 0.086 -0.070 0.174
(0.954) (0.900) (0.956) (1.040)
Female 0.523 0.524 0.435 0.468
(0.500) (0.501) (0.497) (0.501)
Black 0.586 0.452** 0.556 0.468
(0.493) (0.499) (0.498) (0.501)
Hispanic 0.288 0.422** 0.306 0.318
(0.453) (0.495) (0.461) (0.467)
Free/Reduced Lunch 0.716 0.711 0.701 0.740
(0.452) (0.455) (0.459) (0.440)
Note: The table reports group means (baseline score) and proportions (female, black, Hispanic, free/reduced
lunch) pooling the Bloom 2009 and Bloom 2010 waves. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Baseline score is standardized within wave using the full sample of Bloom students. Asterisks indicate a
difference of means (compared to pooled control with standard errors clustered by class) significant at the
10/5/1 percent level.
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Table 2b: Baseline Characteristics by Treatment Group: CH Elementary
Control Financial Low Financial High Non-financial
N 179 165 30 69
Baseline Score -0.511 -0.510 -0.399 -0.682
(0.765) (0.781) (1.067) (0.775)
Grade 6.179 5.133*** 5.400** 5.072***
(1.958) (1.446) (1.380) (1.229)
Female 0.503 0.497 0.433 0.449
(0.501) (0.502) (0.504) (0.501)
Black 0.497 0.461 0.300** 0.290***
(0.501) (0.500) (0.466) (0.457)
Hispanic 0.391 0.461 0.633** 0.623***
(0.489) (0.500) (0.490) (0.488)
Free/Reduced Lunch 0.877 0.891 0.900 0.928
(0.329) (0.313) (0.305) (0.261)
IEP 0.109 0.070 0.034 0.101
(0.313) (0.257) (0.186) (0.304)
Note: The table reports group means (baseline score, grade) and proportions (female, black, Hispanic,
free/reduced lunch, IEP). Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Baseline score is standardized
within grade using full sample of Illinois students. Asterisks indicate a difference of means (compared to
pooled control with standard errors clustered by school-grade) significant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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Table 3: Treatment Effects on Test Score Improvement
Bloom CH CPS
High School Elementary Elementary
Financial Low -0.028 -0.069 0.205** 0.236** -0.065 -0.028
(0.065) (0.053) (0.094) (0.087) (0.110) (0.056)
Financial High 0.195*** 0.120** 0.456*** 0.377** 0.057 0.089**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.145) (0.178) (0.047) (0.040)
Non-Financial 0.317*** 0.262** 0.010 0.063
(0.092) (0.095) (0.045) (0.039)
Financial Loss 0.172*** 0.148** 0.083** 0.103***
(0.051) (0.071) (0.039) (0.036)
Non-Financial Loss 0.078* 0.119***
(0.045) (0.045)
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Students 825 825 423 423 5577 5577
Classes/ School-Grades 38 38 24 24 167 167
Note: The table reports OLS estimates for treatment effects on test score improvement in standard deviation
units for pooled sessions in Bloom and CPS and a single session in CH. Robust standard errors clustered by
class in Bloom and by school & grade in CH and CPS are reported in parentheses. The omitted category
in each regression is the pooled control group. Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) control for session. Columns
(2), (4) and (6) add controls for baseline score on the tested subject (score, score squared and score cubed),
past treatment (CPS), school (CH and CPS), grade (CH and CPS), teacher (Bloom), test subject (CPS)
and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity,language, IEP status and free/reduced lunch status). Asterisks
indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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Table 4: Treatment Effects by Grade
CPS
2nd-5th Grade 6th-8th Grade
Financial Low 0.153*** 0.011 -0.110** 0.002
(0.054) (0.117) (0.042) (0.080)
Financial High 0.121* 0.140** -0.018 -0.009
(0.067) (0.056) (0.054) (0.056)
Non-Financial 0.055 0.122** -0.060 0.038
(0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.065)
Financial Loss 0.059 0.098* 0.130** 0.117**
(0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.046)
Non-Financial Loss 0.176*** 0.249*** -0.101** -0.012
(0.048) (0.057) (0.048) (0.052)
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes
Students 3203 3203 2374 2374
School-Grades 112 112 73 73
Note: The table reports OLS estimates for treatment effects on test score improvement in standard deviation
units for pooled sessions. Robust standard errors clustered by school & grade are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category in each regression is the pooled control group. All regressions control for session.
Columns (2) and (4) add controls for baseline score on the tested subject (score, score squared and score
cubed), past treatment, school, grade, test subject and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, language, IEP
status and free/reduced lunch status). Asterisks indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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Table 5: Effect of Delayed Rewards
CPS
Immediate Delayed
Financial High 0.057 0.089** -0.189 -0.048
(0.047) (0.040) (0.159) (0.163)
Non-Financial 0.010 0.065* -0.164 -0.085
(0.045) (0.039) (0.118) (0.075)
Financial Loss 0.083** 0.102*** -0.048 0.198
(0.039) (0.036) (0.156) (0.131)
Non-Financial Loss 0.078* 0.120*** -0.160 -0.105
(0.045) (0.045) (0.121) (0.126)
Session Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes
Students 5471 5471 542 542
School-Grades 167 167 38 38
Note: The table reports OLS estimates for treatment effects on test score improvement in standard deviation
units for pooled sessions in columns (1)-(2) and a single session in columns (3)-(4) (delayed treatments
occurred in only one session). Robust standard errors clustered by school & grade are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category in each regression is the pooled control group for the relevant session(s). Columns
(1)-(2) control for session. Column (3) contains no controls. Columns (2) and (4) add controls for baseline
score on the tested subject (score, score squared and score cubed), past treatment, school, grade, test subject
and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, language, IEP status and free/reduced lunch status). Asterisks
indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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Table 6: Treatment Effects by Test Subject
CPS
Reading Math
Financial Low -0.120** -0.142*** 0.100 0.186
(0.058) (0.051) (0.063) (0.245)
Financial High 0.024 0.072* 0.198** 0.307***
(0.054) (0.041) (0.093) (0.077)
Non-Financial 0.001 0.053 0.081 0.169
(0.050) (0.048) (0.081) (0.112)
Financial Loss 0.038 0.036 0.230*** 0.353***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.069) (0.101)
Non-Financial Loss 0.089 0.122** 0.078 0.171**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.078) (0.079)
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other covariates Yes Yes
Students 3953 3953 1605 1605
School-Grades 131 131 74 74
Note: The table reports OLS estimates for treatment effects on test score improvement in standard deviation
units for pooled sessions. Robust standard errors clustered by school & grade are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category in each regression is the pooled control group. All regressions control for session.
Columns (2) and (4) add controls for baseline score on the tested subject (score, score squared and score
cubed), past treatment, school, grade and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, language, IEP status and
free/reduced lunch status). Asterisks indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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Table 7: Treatment Effects by Gender
Bloom CPS
Female Male Female Male
Financial Low -0.191* -0.161** 0.160* 0.065 -0.085 0.000 -0.052 -0.077
(0.105) (0.077) (0.092) (0.099) (0.097) (0.072) (0.123) (0.081)
Financial High 0.164** 0.110 0.226*** 0.143* 0.023 0.070 0.097* 0.113**
(0.066) (0.072) (0.065) (0.076) (0.052) ( 0.044) (0.057) (0.055)
Non-Financial -0.030 0.019 0.048 0.117**
(0.054) (0.050) (0.049) (0.047)
Financial Loss 0.080 0.031 0.225*** 0.257** 0.051 0.061 0.116** 0.159***
(0.080) (0.096) (0.081) (0.101) (0.043) ( 0.043) (0.051) (0.052)
Non-Financial Loss 0.052 0.086* 0.106* 0.152***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.054) (0.055)
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Students 412 412 413 413 2829 2829 2748 2748
Classes/School-Grades 38 38 38 38 167 167 166 166
Note: The table reports OLS estimates for treatment effects on test score improvement in standard deviation
units for pooled sessions. Robust standard errors clustered by class in Bloom and by school & grade in
CPS are reported in parentheses. The omitted category in each regression is the pooled control group.
All regressions control for session. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) add controls for baseline score on the
tested subject (score, score squared and score cubed), past treatment (CPS), school (CPS), grade (CPS),
teacher (Bloom), test subject (CPS) and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, language, IEP status and
free/reduced lunch status). Asterisks indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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Table 8: Treatment Effects on Future Tests
Bloom CPS
Same Subject Same Subject Following Subject
Following Test Session Following Test Session Same Test Session
Financial Low -0.324*** -0.295* 0.014 -0.023 -0.115* 0.046
(0.098) (0.137) (0.090) (0.082) (0.064) (0.077)
Financial High 0.012 -0.045 -0.065* -0.021 0.027 -0.065
(0.130) (0.157) (0.034) (0.037) (0.063) (0.043)
Non-Financial -0.035 -0.040 0.042 -0.022
(0.035) (0.032) (0.086) (0.052)
Financial Loss -0.035 -0.040 0.026 -0.011
(0.033) (0.027) (0.074) (0.042)
Non-Financial Loss -0.038 -0.005 0.090 0.054
(0.040) (0.037) (0.082) (0.043)
Following Test Session Treatment Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Students 268 268 5298 5298 4574 4574
Classes/School-Grades 13 13 166 166 160 160
Note: The table reports OLS estimates for treatment effects on test score improvement in standard deviation
units for pooled sessions in CPS and a single session in Bloom (a Following Test Session occurred in only
one session in Bloom). Robust standard errors clustered by class in Bloom and by school & grade in CPS
are reported in parentheses. Columns (1) - (4) control for treatment on the following test. Columns (3) - (6)
include controls for session. Columns (2), (4) and (6) add controls for baseline score on the tested subject
(score, score squared and score cubed), past treatment (CPS), school (CPS), grade (CPS), test subject (CPS)
and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, language, IEP status and free/reduced lunch status). Asterisks
indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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A Appendix: Administrator Scripts
A.1 Bloom
Common to all treatments
To the teacher:
Please read the following statement to your students immediately before they begin the
STAR test (after you have given them your regular instructions for testing):
Bloom 2009
Financial Low ($10) You are about to take the STAR Reading Assessment. You also
took the STAR Reading Assessment in the fall. If your score on the STAR today is higher
than your score in the fall, you will receive $10. You will be paid at the end of the test.
Please fill out your name, signature and date on the assent form. You will turn this in at
the end of the test.
Financial High ($20) You are about to take the STAR Reading Assessment. You also
took the STAR Reading Assessment in the fall. If your score on the STAR today is higher
than your score in the fall, you will receive $20. You will be paid at the end of the test.
Please fill out your name, signature and date on the assent form. You will turn this in at
the end of the test.
Bloom 2010
Control - Statement
You are about to take the STAR Reading Assessment. You also took the STAR Reading
Assessment in the fall. Please try to improve your score from the fall.
Financial High ($20) You are about to take the STAR Reading Assessment. You also
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took the STAR Reading Assessment in the fall. If your score on the STAR today is higher
than your score in the fall, you will receive $20. You will be paid at the end of the test.
Please fill out your name, signature and date on the assent form. You will turn this in at
the end of the test.
Financial Loss ($20) You are about to take the STAR Reading Assessment. You also
took the STAR Reading Assessment in the fall. Please try to improve your score from the
fall.
In front of you is an envelope that contains $20. Please open the envelope to confirm that
there is $20 inside. [Wait for students to open envelope and sign confirmation form.]
If you improve your score from the fall, you will get to keep the $20. If you do not improve
your score from the fall, you will not get to keep the $20. You will have to return the $20
immediately after the test.
A.2 Chicago Heights
Common to all treatments
To the teacher:
Please read the following statement to your students immediately before they begin the
STAR test (after you have given them your regular instructions for testing):
Control - Statement
You are about to take the ThinkLink Learning test. You also took ThinkLink in the winter.
Please try to improve your score from the winter.
Control - Statement - Comparison
You are about to take the ThinkLink Learning test. You also took ThinkLink in the winter.
Please try to improve your score from the winter. We will compare your improvement to 3
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other students who had the same score as you in the winter.
Financial Low ($10)
You are about to take the ThinkLink Learning test. You also took ThinkLink in the winter.
Please try to improve your score from the winter. If you improve your score from the winter,
you will receive $10. You will be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Financial Low ($10) - Comparison
You are about to take the ThinkLink Learning test. You also took ThinkLink in the winter.
Please try to improve your score from the winter. We will compare your improvement to 3
other students who had the same score as you in the winter. If you improve your score from
the winter, you will receive $10. You will be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Financial High ($20)
You are about to take the ThinkLink Learning test. You also took ThinkLink in the winter.
Please try to improve your score from the winter. If you improve your score from the winter,
you will receive $20. You will be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Non-Financial (Trophy)
You are about to take the ThinkLink Learning test. You also took ThinkLink in the winter.
Please try to improve your score from the winter. If you improve your score from the winter,
you will receive this trophy and we will post a photo like this of you in the class [show sample
photo]. You will receive the trophy and be photographed immediately after the test.
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A.3 Chicago Public School
Common to all treatments
To the teacher:
Please read the following statement to your students immediately before they begin the
Scantron test (after you have given them your regular instructions for testing):
Control - Statement
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring. You will learn your score immediately after the test.
Control - Statement - Delayed
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring. You will learn your score one month after the test.
Financial Low ($10)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will
receive $10. You will learn your score and be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Financial High ($20)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will
receive $20. You will learn your score and be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Financial High ($20) - Delayed
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will
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receive $20. You will learn your score and be paid in cash one month after the test.
Financial Loss ($20)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring.
You are being given an envelope that contains $20. Please open the envelope to make sure
that there is $20 inside. Please sign the form that says that this is your $20. And write
down what you will do with your $20. [Wait for students to open envelope and complete the
confirmation form.]
If you improve your score from the spring, you will get to keep your $20. If you do not
improve your score from the spring, you will have to return your $20. You will learn your
score and whether you get to keep your $20 immediately after the test
Financial Loss ($20) - Delayed
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring.
You are being given an envelope that contains $20. Please open the envelope to make sure
that there is $20 inside. Please sign the form that says that this is your $20. And write
down what you will do with your $20.[Wait for students to open envelope and complete the
confirmation form.]
If you improve your score from the spring, you will get to keep your $20. If you do not
improve your score from the spring, you will have to return your $20. You will learn your
score and whether you get to keep your $20 one month after the test.
Non-Financial (Trophy)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will
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receive this trophy [SHOW SAMPLE TROPHY ]. You will learn your score and receive the
trophy immediately after the test.
Non-Financial (Trophy) - Delayed
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will
receive this trophy [SHOW SAMPLE TROPHY ]. You will learn your score and receive the
trophy one month after the test.
Non-Financial Loss (Trophy)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring.
You are being given a trophy. Please sign the form that says that this is your trophy. And
write down what you will do with your trophy. [Wait for students to complete the confirma-
tion form.]
If you improve your score from the spring, you will get to keep the trophy [SHOW SAMPLE
TROPHY ]. If you do not improve your score from the spring, you will have to return your
trophy. You will learn your score and whether you get to keep your trophy immediately after
the test.
Non-Financial Loss (Trophy) - Delayed
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try
to improve your score from the spring.
You are being given a trophy. Please sign the form that says that this is your trophy.
And write down what you will do with your trophy. [Wait for students to complete the
confirmation form.]
If you improve your score from the spring, you will get to keep the trophy [SHOW SAMPLE
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TROPHY ]. If you do not improve your score from the spring, you will have to return your
trophy. You will learn your score and whether you get to keep your trophy one month after
the test.
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